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I. INTRODUCTION
In the latter half of the 1980s, all but five states' have enacted some
form of public sector collective bargaining statute. As many as twenty-
nine states have passed statutes authorizing bargaining for public em-
ployees in the short period since 1970.2 Public sector collective bargaining
is a relatively new field and states have been both creative and diverse
in the development of laws relating to the area.
A possible explanation for this legislative variety relates to the unique
problems that arise in public sector as opposed to private sector collective
bargaining. For example, in the public sector the government has the
dual role of sovereign and manager in the bargaining process, the result
being that the interests may and do conflict.3 The public sector work
force and the nature of the services provided are also generally different
from that found in the private sector." There is a higher percentage of
"professionals" in the public sector, and the services provided are
frequently geared to public health and welfare with the government
being the sole provider of a service in many cases. This difference
affects how states have dealt with the right to strike issue. Profit motive
is another key ingredient in private sector collective bargaining that
does not exist in the public sector.5
To states attempting to develop comprehensive collective bargaining,
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)" which governs private sector
labor relations, has provided an obvious model. Because of the differences
in the public and private sectors, however, many variations have evolved.
Despite these variations, the existing legislation appears to have three
overriding goals.' The first goal is to avoid strikes by public employees,
particularly in critical health and safety areas. The second goal is to
replace actual strikes with strike-like incentives in an effort to maintain
a balance of bargaining power. The third and most important goal is
to retain the benefits of free collective bargaining where the parties
negotiate their own agreement in recognition of the fact that the best
1. Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia. 1 PUB.
EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 400-451.
2. id.
3. P. PRASOw & E. PETERS, ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIvE BARGAINING: CON-
FLIcT RESOLUTION IN LABOR RELATIONS, 235-36 (1970).
4. Note, The Scope of Negotiations Under the Iowa Public Employment Relations
Act, 63 IowA L. REV. 649, 656 (1978).
5. Id. at 655.
6. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976).
7. Meagher, New Frontiers in Dispute Resolution: Skills and Techniques, in NEW
TECHNIQUES IN LABOR DISPuTE RESOLUTION: A REPORT OF THE 23rd CONFERENCE OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR MEDIATION AGENCIES AND THE 2nd CONFERENCE OF PROFES-
SIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 178 (Anderson ed. 1976).
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agreement is usually one achieved voluntarily by the parties.
To accomplish these goals, states have incorporated three primary
dispute resolution techniques into the bargaining process which are
mediation, fact-finding, and interest arbitration Much attention has
been given to general reviews of these techniques, but much less attention
has been given to some of the variations states have utilized and some
of the extrinsic factors that may influence the success of the three
techniques. The purpose of this Note is to step beyond an overview of
the primary techniques and to evaluate and explore how these variations
and extrinsic factors impact the utility and effectiveness of the tech-
niques. The majority of the variations and factors discussed here are
statutory, rather than environmental factors such as political climate or
the state of the economy The Note will also include a review of the
Ohio Collective Bargaining Law for Public Employees, which became
law in 1984,' and provides an excellent example of how the utility and
effectiveness of a dispute resolution technique are impacted by tht
legislature's choice of both configuration and structure of the available
techniques.
II. MEDIATION, FACT-FINDING, AND ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW
To understand how variations and extrinsic factors impact the use
of primary dispute resolution techniques, it is imperative to briefly
review the techniques themselves. Mediation, the most commonly utilized
of the three techniques,"0 employs a knowledgeable, neutral third party
to facilitate an agreement between the public employer and the employee
representative." Mediation combines at least six procedural, communi-
cative, and substantive functions: (1) educating the parties relative to
the bargaining process; (2) helping the parties gain a better understanding
of the other's position; (3) helping the parties reduce hostility by de-
veloping objectivity; (4) providing a format for problem resolution during
mediation for the parties to utilize when additional problems arise; (5)
presenting additional alternatives to the parties that may keep them at
the bargaining table; and (6) providing alternatives that individual parties
would be unable to advance without losing face and which may assist
the parties in making concessions.' 2 Mediation is often statutorily man-
dated prior to use of other techniques and is considered part of the
8. See I PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 4000.
9. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.14 (Page Supp. 1983).
10. Kruger and Jones, Compulsory Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector: An
Overview, 10 J. COLLECTIVE NEG. 355, 356 (1981).
1i. Kochan, Dynamics of Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR
BARGAINING 179 (B. Aaron, J. Grodin, and J. Stern eds. 1979).
12. Perez, Dispute Resolution Procedures in Public Employee Bargaining, 17 URB.
LAW 199, 210-11 (1985).
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collective bargaining process, but not a substitute for that process. Parties
continue to have a duty to bargain outside the mediation process."
Fact-finding is frequently the middle step between mediation and
binding interest arbitration and incorporates some of the functions and
rationales of each. Fact-finding involves a neutral third party or panel
that hears evidence on the respective positions of both parties in an
adversarial hearing and then makes recommendations based on the
evidence. 4 The recommendations may be published for public con-
sumption depending on the statute. 5 When fact-finding is not binding,
either statutorily or functionally, the publication process places public
pressure on the parties to either reach agreement or accept the fact-
finder's recommendation.16 Fact-finding forces parties to clarify their
positions in concrete terms, enables parties to discover which issues are
most important to their opponent, narrows the issues for arbitration if
settlement is not reached,"7 places public pressure on the parties to adopt
the fact-finder's recommendation, and provides one more opportunity
for the parties to move toward resolution and possibly voluntary
settlement.
The two kinds of fact-finding that have been identified are the advisory
arbitration model and the super-mediation model. The advisory arbitra-
tion model resembles interest arbitration without a binding recommen-
dation and utilizes a quasi-judicial procedure when there is limited
contact between the fact-finder and the parties. 9 The super-mediation
model, on the other hand, is a more informal process and allows the
fact-finder to revert to mediation and actively participate in the process.
2
0
Two criticisms of fact-finding are that it inhibits the parties from
presenting final offers because they anticipate the fact-finding process,2
and that it duplicates what takes place at arbitration. 22 The parties may
fail to bargain with realistic final offers and instead rely upon the fact-
finder to dictate the terms of an agreement in hopes that it will be
13. Id. at 211.
14. Bierman, Fact-finding: Finding the Public Interest, 9 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 667, 668
(1978).
15. C. RHYNE & R. DRUMMER, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS 171-72
(1979).
16. Id. at 172.
17. Lund, Impasse Resolution Under the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act:
A Defense of Fact-Finding, 30 DRAKE L. REv. 561, 578-79 (1980-81).
18. Perez, supra note 12, at 214.
19. Gerhart & Drotning, Is Fact-finding Useful in the Public Sector?, 10 J. COL-
LECTIVE NEG. 279, 280-82 (1981).
20. C. RHYNE & R. DRUMMER, supra note 15, at 172. The use of mediation as part
of the fact-finding process is the critical variation in the two models and will be discussed
more thoroughly later.
21. Id.,at 174.
22. Geihart & Drotning, supra note 19, at 284.
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more favorable and will prevent humiliation when concessions must be
made to reach a voluntary agreement. Fact-finding and arbitration may
be duplicative in several ways including the nature and scope of the
proceeding, the parties presentation of their respective positions, the
issuance of a written decision, and the criteria utilized by the neutral
third party 23
Prior to discussing interest arbitration, it is helpful to define some
important terms. "Interest arbitration" involves determination of sub-
stantive terms of a new contract, while "grievance arbitration" involves
disputes over terms in an existing contract." If a legally binding contract
award results, then it is called "binding interest arbitration."25
Arbitration is considered more effective than mediation or fact-finding
in preventing strikes, and there is evidence showing that strikes occur
far less frequently when arbitration is statutorily mandated." A possible
explanation is that interest arbitration has "strike-like" characteristics.
If an arbitrator is favorable to the union, public employees are provided
with a level of bargaining power they do not inherently possess, and
the potential losses to an employer are similar to those a strike might
have imposed. Hence, interest arbitration is more favorable to the public
employee than the public employer.27
Two distinctly different kinds of interest arbitration are conventional
arbitration and final offer arbitration. Of those jurisdictions employing
arbitration, a majority utilize conventional arbitration." Theoretically,
the arbitrator or arbitration panel, after hearing evidence from both
sides, issues a decision based on either statutory standards or the
standards that have evolved through arbitration of public sector labor
disputes generally In reality, the arbitrator has immense discretion and
is free to shape a decision based on a personal evaluation of the situation.
In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator is not limited to the final
offers of the parties or the fact-finder's recommendation.
There are three major criticisms of conventional arbitration. First, it
23. Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 943, 966 (1969).
24. Seplowitz, Final Offer Arbitration: The Last Word in Public Sector Labor
Disputes, 10 COL. J. OF LAW AND SOC. PROBLEMS 525 (1974).
25. Id.
26. Feuille, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 64, 65 (1979) (derived from Hoyt N. Wheeler, An Analysis of Fire Fighter
Strikes, 26 LAB. L.J., 17-20 (January 1975)); J. LOWENBERG, W GERSHENFELD, H.
GLASBECK, B. HEPPLE & K. WALKER, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 165 (Lexington, Mass.
D.C. Heath, 1976); J. TERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOWENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS,
FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION 189 (Lexington, Mass. D.C. Heath, 1975); P Feuille, Final-
Offer Arbitration, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LIBRARY SERIES No. 50, 10-11 (Chicago:
International Personnel Management Association, 1975).
27. Seplowitz, supra note 24, at 526.
28. 1 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP (CCH) 400-451.
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may have a "chilling effect" on the parties by preventing them from
bargaining in good faith. Because arbitrators frequently "split the dif-
ference" between the parties' positions, there is hope that an arbitration
agreement will be more beneficial than making concessions at the
bargaining table. Second, it produces a "narcotic effect" on the parties
by making them dependent on the arbitration process rather than
participating in independent collective bargaining. Finally, there is often
a "flip-flop" effect where the arbitrator holds for one party on an issue
at one proceeding and for the other party on the same issue in a
successive proceeding.29
Final offer arbitration, the second type of interest arbitration, has
become increasingly popular in recent years because it eliminates some
of the negative effects that conventional arbitration has on the bargaining
process.3 0 Each party submits to the arbitrator a final offer on all
disputed issues, and the arbitrator must decide on one of the two offers.3
Because of the potential cost to the losing party, final offer arbitration
provides a strong incentive for the parties to reach a voluntary agreement
prior to arbitration.3 2 It also forces the parties who do reach arbitration
to present more reasonable offers.33 Another benefit is that the arbitrator
is not granted undue discretion since the parties control the content of
their final offers.-' On the other hand, a problem with final offer
arbitration is the potential for unfair results that might be prevented if
the arbitrator had more flexibility to shape a decision based on the
circumstances." There are variations that may provide the arbitrator
with additional flexibility
III. VARIATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES
States have not simply taken the traditional dispute resolution tech-
niques, either singularly or in a particular combination, and uniformly
implemented them. In an effort to design an effective framework for
collective bargaining in the public sector, states have used these tech-
niques in a variety of combinations and have also varied the use of
individual techniques. The following discusses some of the variations
that have evolved and the implications for success on the respective
dispute resolution procedures.
29. Kruger & Jones, supra note 10, at 359.
30. C. RHYNE & R. DRUMMER, supra note 15, at 176.
31. Id. at 177.
32. Gallagher, The Use of Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 33 LAB. L.J.
501, 505 (1982).
33. Seplowitz, supra note 24, at 528.
34. J. GRODIN, D. WOLLET & R. ALLEYNE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT, Unit 4, 276 (1979).
35. Seplowitz, supra note 24, at 530-31.
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A. Mediation
Mediation is the most widely used dispute resolution technique in
public sector bargaining 6 and is utilized more frequently in the public
sector than the private sector. In Iowa, only about 15% of private sector
-contracts are reached with the help of mediation, but as many as 62%
to 72% of public sector contracts are concluded with mediation as part
of the process.37 Mediation is frequently the first step in the dispute
resolution process, but it may also be utilized at a variety of different
points during the process. 8 The goal of interjecting mediation at a
variety of locations in the process is to provide the parties with as many
opportunities and incentives to reach their own agreement as possible.
Mediation may or may not be statutorily mandated, but even when
mandated, mediation is the least coercive of the three procedures. When
mediation is mandatory, failure to participate is construed as a failure
to bargain in good faith and results in an unfair labor practice charge.
An unfair labor practice proceeding has the potential not only to delay
an agreement, but the proceeding may push the parties farther apart
and prevent an agreement. The rule as to whether an impasse must be
reached on every bargaining item before mediation can be implemented
also differs among states. At least one state has held that insisting on
bargaining to impasse on a non-mandatory subject is an unfair labor
practice in the public sector context.39
These variations in mediation technique can change the parties'
expectations of the process and create a different result. For example,
if mediation is merely the first step in the process, it may be viewed
as a waste of time, or at best, an opportunity to discover the other
side's position and a way to narrow the issues for fact-finding or
arbitration.' In some states, the goal of mediation may be to narrow
the issues. In other jurisdictions, the goal of mediation is to break the
impasse and reach an agreement. In reality, mediation often services
both goals.4
B. Fact-Finding
The issue of whether fact-finding is a viable and beneficial technique
36. 1 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 400-451.
37. Phillips, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining: The Need
to Reevaluate Options, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 547, 549 (1978-1979).
38. Meagher, supra note 7, at 178.
39. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, Local 107 v. City of Mount Vernon, [Dec. 1977
- May 1980 Transfer Binder, Adm. Rul.] PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH)
40,768 (N.Y.P.E.R.B. Nov. 9, 1978).
40. Meagher, supra note 7, at 178.
41. Id.
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to be utilized in public sector collective bargaining is the source of
much controversy. There is not only disagreement about what should
be expected of the procedure, but also when and how fact-finding should
be available to the parties. Some commentators believe fact-finding is
redundant and should be eliminated because it is too costly in both
time and money, while others believe it is the most critical and pivotal
point in the negotiation process and must be retained."2
The most noteworthy variation of the fact-finding process does not
concern the technique itself, but how this procedural stage fits within
the total process. Fact-finding is considered less valuable when it is
totally advisory in nature, although it does serve the function of helping
the parties narrow the issues for possible arbitration. It also provides
one more opportunity for the parties to reach voluntary agreement. 3
Fact-finding is most valuable when followed by final offer arbitration
that includes the fact-finder's recommendation as one of the options.
In this configuration, the fact-finder's recommendation will frequently
become the arbitrator's decision. Awareness that the fact-finder's decision
may become binding forces the parties to reach a voluntary settlement
at an earlier point in the process if they wish to avoid an imposed
resolution. If the fact-finder also functions as-a mediator, a mediated
settlement is more likely at this juncture." Thus, this fact-finding model
consists of a voluntary agreement achieved with the assistance of a
neutral third party.
Another fact-finding model suggests the mediator be allowed the
option of recommending fact-finding only when it is warranted, instead
of requiring fact-finding as a mandatory step in the process. The mediator
could recommend fact-finding when the parties have a great deal of
distance between them, and fact-finding might help bring them closer
together and "buy" time for a voluntary agreement.45
Two other variations of the fact-finding model deserve mention. First,
various jurisdictions have different consequences following fact-finding
that clearly have the potential to influence the total process. It has
already been mentioned that fact-finding followed by final offer arbi-
tration has some important benefits. Fact-finding followed by conven-
tional arbitration receives criticism for being redundant due to the
commonality in the procedures."6 When fact-finding is the final dispute
resolution procedure in the process without arbitration as a subsequent
option, some jurisdictions have devised statutory consequences to enhance
the process' ability to either encourage voluntary settlement or to dis-
42. Lund, supra note 17, at 564-73.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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courage the parties from a work stoppage. Several states require leg-
islative intervention following the process.": Florida, for example, requires
that the legislature settle the dispute if the fact-finder's recommendation
is rejected by the parties. Ohio requires a three-fifths vote of the
membership of the legislature or the employee organization for the
respective parties to reject the fact-finder's opinion.
The second variation involves preventing the fact-finding process from
being overused and from having a chilling effect on negotiations. One
method is to make the parties pay more for the process, but not so
much that it becomes impractical and ceases to be a strike prevention
technique." Another method is to require both an agency determination
that a bona fide impasse exists, and a written justification for the
impasse before proceeding to fact-finding. 9 These legislated obstacles
are designed to limit access to the fact-finding process and to prevent
the parties from automatically deferring serious bargaining in anticipation
of the process.
C. Interest Arbitration
When analyzing variations among interest arbitration procedures it
is important to remember that the primary purpose of arbitration is to
provide a workable and acceptable mechanism for resolving the disputed
issues between the parties that approximates the agreement the parties
would have reached voluntarily while avoiding a work stoppage.50 It is
also important to note that generally, third-party determination of con-
tract terms benefits labor more than management, although the impact
may differ depending on which model is used.5" As noted earlier, the
two kinds of interest arbitration are conventional and final offer.52 There
are five variations that apply to both types of interest arbitration. There
are also a number of variations that apply only to final offer arbitration.
The first variation that applies to both kinds of interest arbitration
involves the issue of compulsion. Not all states that utilize arbitration
as a technique mandate arbitration. It may be entirely optional, it may
be mandatory for certain classifications of employees, such as essential
47. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.403(4) (West 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(6)
(Page Supp. 1983).
48. Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
79 YALE L.J. 805 (1970).
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473(a) (West Supp. 1969).
50. J. STERN, C. REHMUS, J. LOWENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS, FINAL-OFFER
ARBITRATION 281 (1975) [hereinafter STERN].
51. Hogler and Kriksciun, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Negoti-
ations: A Proposed Procedure, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 481, 487 (1984).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
[Vol. 2:2 1987]
PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
public safety employees, or it may be mandatory for all employees. 53
Jurisdictions that have non-compulsory arbitration usually have some
other mechanism to resolve disputes. For example, the legislature may
be empowered to settle a dispute when the parties fail to reach an
agreement after fact-finding. 54
A second variation among state statutes is the incorporation of a
specific list of criteria for the arbitrator to consider when making a
decision. Although statutes vary, criteria given the most importance are
comparability, ability to pay, and the cost of living.5 It is unclear
whether these statutory criteria actually affect the arbitrator's decision.
Other factors that may impact an arbitrator's decision include, but are
not limited to, personality, skill level, prior arbitration between the
parties, and the dispute resolution procedures which have preceded the
arbitration. New Jersey arbitrators indicated that the lack of quality
evidence made reliance on statutory criteria difficult and forced them
to use their own common sense.56 Since arbitrators are not required to
provide extensive justification for their decisions, it is impossible to
know if the use of criteria is an important factor.
A third variation applicable to both types of interest arbitration
concerns the subjects that may be submitted to arbitration. Submission
of non-mandatory subjects to arbitration has frequently been found to
be an unfair labor practice.57 If permissive subjects were allowed to be
submitted, the process would be much more cumbersome and expensive.
A hybrid technique, known as mediation-arbitration or med-arb, is
the fourth variation. Sometimes called "mediation with muscle" or
"mediation with a club," med-arb combines the techniques of mediation
and arbitration in the same step and sometimes utilizes the same third-
party intervenor. The technique involves an arbitrator who attempts to
mediate a settlement if possible, while retaining the authority to make
a binding decision on those issues that remain unsettled. 56 Benefits of
this technique are that the parties still have the opportunity and incentive
53. Gilory & Simcropi, Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector: The State of the
Art Report to Department of Labor, Division of Public Employment Relations Services,
in LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 783 (Smith, Edwards & Clark eds.
1974).
54. See supra text accompanying note 47.
55. Weitzman & Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbitrators Toward FinIl-Offer Arbitration
in New Jersey, 35 ARB. J. 25, 26 (Mar. 1980). Comparability or "the going rate" is said
to be the controlling factor in most arbitrator's decisions.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Kagel, Comment 185, 186, in A REPORT TO THE 23RD CONFERENCE OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF LABOR MEDIATION AGENCIES AND THE 2ND CONFERENCE OF THE So-
CIETY OF PROFESSIONALS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Anderson ed. 1976). See also Weitz-
man & Stochaj, supra note 55, at 27; Ross, The Med-Arb Process in Labor Agreement
Negotiations (SPIDR Committee on Research and Education, Occasional Paper No. 824,
Feb. 1982).
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to reach a voluntary settlement and the arbitrator has a better grasp
of the parties' actual bargaining positions if forced to make a final
decision.5 9
There are several criticisms of the med-arb process. Within a final
offer arbitration context, it is contended that because the parties can
continually modify their final offers, the "fear" that encourages the
parties to agree short of arbitration will not be as great, and reduces
the parties' incentive to seriously negotiate prior to arbitration. 60 A
controversial practice in the med-arb arena is to incorporate voluntarily
mediated agreements into the arbitration decision. This disguises the
fact that the parties have actually made concessions and allows the
negotiators to save face.6' Another concern frequently noted is that to
effectively combine the two techniques, special skills are required in
two areas that not all arbitrators possess. Therefore, the ultimate success
of med-arb may depend upon the skills of the individual arbitrator.61
A fifth variation involving both kinds of interest arbitration concerns
the finality of the award. Statutes often treat economic issues differently
than policy issues, but some even treat the arbitrator's decision on each
type of issue differently In some statutes the decision on a policy issue
may be only advisory, whereas the decision on an economic issue is
final. For example, in Maine, the arbitrator's decision is final for all
issues except wages, pensions and insurance. The decision for these
issues is merely advisory 63 In Pennsylvania, an award is binding unless
enabling legislation is required, which would include budget legislation
for economic issues.64 In other jurisdictions, final offer arbitration applies
to economic issues. 65 Any other findings relative to policy are of an
advisory nature.
Final offer arbitration has been heralded as a highly effective way
of "encouraging" the parties to voluntarily agree based on their fear of
a substantial loss if the other party's final offer is selected. Two major
variations of final-offer arbitration tend to mitigate the "all or nothing"
stakes. Official offer arbitration, a relatively new procedure currently
utilized in Iowa and Massachussets, provides for including the fact-
finder's recommendation as one of the options the arbitrator may choose
from when making a final decision. 66 This variation's impact is to make
the fact-finding process much more critical because, in a majority of
59. Id. at 187.
60. Gallagher, supra note 32, at 505.
61. Meagher, supra note 7, at 169.
62. Id.
63. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(4)(D) (1974).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
65. J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETT & R. ALLEYNE, supra note 34, at 281.
66. Rehmus, Varieties of Final Offer Arbitration, 37 ARB. J. 4, 5-6 (1982).
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cases, the fact-finder's recommendation becomes the arbitration decision.
A resulting criticism is that the arbitration hearing then becomes re-
dundant.67 Another criticism of final-offer arbitration is that it forces
the arbitrator to select the lesser of two evils when both final offers
are unrealistic. The inclusion of the fact-finder's recommendation as a
potential option may prevent unreasonable decisions, but it may also
provide the arbitrator with an easy decision and discourage the parties
from presenting realistic offers. 6 The parties remain free to make offers
based on political considerations knowing that the fact-finder's report
is another option.
Another variation that prevents the possible draconian results of final
offer arbitration is known as "issue-by-issue" arbitration, as opposed to
arbitration of the "total package." Issue-by-issue arbitration involves the
arbitrator making a decision on each individual issue submitted for
arbitration. "Total package" arbitration produces a single decision on
the entire package of issues presented by each party There are two
problems that arise in total package arbitration. First, the arbitrator's
choice between two, and possibly three options allows little opportunity-
for the arbitrator to apply appropriate statutory or common law stand-
ards. Second, the arbitrator may be forced to render an unrealistic
decision if the parties have submitted unreasonable final offers. 69 It Is
possible that issue-by-issue arbitration will produce a more equitable
decision, but there are many criticisms of this variation. It should be
noted that one of the primary goals of final offer arbitration is to
encourage the parties to reach their own agreement, not reach the most
equitable one.7°The issue-by-issue procedure may discourage the parties
from narrowing the issues, and leave many political and low priority
items on the table wasting time and money.7' It may also interfere with
a party's flexibility on a particular issue if the party feels the issue is
a bargaining chip for later use when bargaining on another issue.72 The
items in many proposals are dependent upon one another and not
separable for all practical purposes.73 In some jurisdictions only economic
issues are submitted for issue-by-issue determination and among juris-
dictions there is inconsistency concerning what constitutes an economic
issue. 74 Research of the issue-by-issue system in Michigan shows that it
67. Id. at 6.
68. Meagher, supra note 7, at 169.
69. Anderson, MacDonald & O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective
Bargaining - An Examination of Compulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. R-v. 453, 496 (1977).
70. J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETT & R. ALLEYNE, supra note 34, at 278-79.
71. Id. at 279.
72. Anderson, MacDonald & O'Reilly, supra note 69, at 498.
73. Zack, Final Offer Selection - Panacea or Pandora s Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F 567,
579 (1974).
74. STERN, supra note 50, at 499.
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has failed to reduce the number of cases that reach arbitration or the
number of issues that are presented there.75
In Eugene, Oregon, another modified version of final offer arbitration
has been implemented to soften the "all or nothing" consequences. Each
party submits two final offer packages which provide the arbitrator with
four options rather than two. This allows the parties more flexibility in
structuring their offers, but it also increases the uncertainty for both
parties regarding the arbitrator's final decision.7 6
When the final offer actually becomes "final" also varies among
jurisdictions. The options range from allowing the parties to continue
revisions of their final offer through the close of the arbitration hearing,
to requiring the submission of the final offer on the table when impasse
occurs. The former may tend to dilute the pressure to reach voluntary
agreement prior to arbitration. 77 The latter substantially increases the
risk of proceeding to arbitration and provides the parties with increased
incentive to avoid impasse and to reach their own agreement. 71
IV EXTRINSIC FACTORS IMPACTING THE PROCESS
A variety of procedural issues extrinsic to the actual techniques and
variations discussed above require consideration when evaluating dispute
resolution procedures in public sector collective bargaining. As stated
earlier, the focus here is on statutory variations rather than outside
variables that impact the process.
Although it has nothing to do with the success of an individual
procedure or combination of procedures, a factor that influences the
ability of the parties to reach resolution is whether there is an option
to by-pass the statutory process by mutually agreeing to an alternative
dispute resolution procedure.7 9 In jurisdictions utilizing this option, a
large percentage of parties find it preferable to substitute their own
methods of dispute resolution for the statutory process. As discussed
below, 0 Ohio has implemented this feature and provides a suggested
list of alternatives."' This legislative option avoids the cost of consuming
limited government resources to resolve disputes. If the parties have
75. J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETr & R. ALLEYNE, supra note 34, at 281.
76. Long & Feuille, Final Arbitration: "Sudden Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 186, 198 (1973-74). This flexibility is particularly helpful in multi-issue
negotiations. It may also permit the parties to-make one offer that is politically acceptable
to their constituents and one offer that is more realistic.
77. Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and Negotiating Incentives, 32 ARB. J. 203, 217
(1977).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 214.
80. See infra text accompanying note 101.
81. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(1) (Page Supp. 1983).
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negotiated the procedure, they will also be more likely to have an
investment in the success of the procedure.
Perhaps the most obvious and important factor impacting the utility
and effectiveness of various dispute resolution techniques is how they
are used in combination and in what configuration. For example, if
mediation continues to be an option throughout the process, even during
the implementation of the other procedures, the results may be quite
different than when mediation is merely the first step or is not utilized
at all since it offers more opportunities to reach a voluntary agreement.
The use of fact-finding as an interim technique between mediation and
interest arbitration8 2may critically affect the other two processes. It has
the potential to render mediation ineffective and, at the same time,
narrow issues that ultimately go to arbitration. The number of cases
that reach arbitration is influenced by the procedures that precede it.
Where all three procedures are used in succession (mediation, fact-
finding, and arbitration), fewer cases ultimately reach arbitration than
if mediation is the only prior step to arbitration or if arbitration alone
is used. 3 Given the fact that various jurisdictions differ enormously on
the combination and configuration of procedures, it would seem to be
a logical conclusion that the perfect model has yet to emerge.
Another critical factor concerns the neutral third-party utilized to
implement the various dispute resolution procedures. This is a multi-
faceted issue and raises a number of questions. First, how many neutrals
are utilized in any given procedure? Usually, mediation is handled by
a single practitioner. Fact-finding and arbitration, however, may utilize
either a single, neutral third party or a panel (most often with three
members) to carry out the process. Statutes vary on whether this issue
is by choice of the parties or mandated. When choice is permitted, the
resources of the party or parties required to pay for the service will
influence how many third-party neutrals can be afforded. 84 The impact
of using a single practitioner or a panel will depend on other factors
such as skill level, personalities, formality of the proceedings, and which
procedure is being used. Group process theory supports the idea that
if more people are involved, the dynamics of the decision-making process
will change.8 5
Second, how are neutral third-parties chosen? In some jurisdictions
82. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 44-45 & 58-62.
83. Perez, supra note 12, at 223.
84. See infra text accompanying note 89.
85. See J. LuFr, GROUP PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO GROUP DYNAMICS, (1970);
J. LuFr, GROUP PROCESS TODAY: EVALUATION AND PERSPECTIVE (Milman & Goldman
eds. 1974).
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they may be appointed by the public employment relations board, 6 but
in most cases the selection is done by the parties. When a panel is
used, each party may choose one of the members and these individuals
in turn choose the third member.
Third, what is the skill level and background of the third-party
neutral? Arbitrators and mediators traditionally come from a variety of
disciplines including lawyers, industrial relations personnel, government
employees, professors, and people who have "grown up" in the area of
labor relations. 87 Skill level is important because the complexity of the
issues is often beyond mere labor questions and may reach into technical
professional policy areas. Also, different skills are required in each of
the three procedures. One of the controversial factors about med-arb is
that mediation is very different from arbitration and the skills and
orientation of one are not necessarily compatible with the other. The
success of mediation is particularly dependent on the abilities of the
neutral third-party who is an active participant in the process and not
just an adjudicator.
Fourth, how is the neutral linked to the particular dispute? When
the parties or the board need to select a neutral third-party, there are
several options depending on which procedure is involved. If a mediator
is required, states have the option of utilizing the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service which was originally formed to serve the private
sector but has been expanded to include the public sector as well. There
is no charge for this service. The American Arbitration Association is
a primary source of arbitrators. Some states employ their own neutral
third-parties or contract with private individuals to perform the job.
If the parties have the option to agree contractually, they have the
freedom to choose anyone as the neutral third-party The source of the
neutral third-party may or may not impact the success of the procedure.
One potential problem with utilizing neutral third-parties who have
primarily functioned in the private sector, however, is that they may
have difficulty in adjusting to the unique issues that arise in the public
sector.
Another factor that has an impact on whether a process is utilized
and to what extent, is who will be responsible for paying the neutral
third-party In many jurisdictions mediation is provided free of charge
to the parties."5 Fact-finding and arbitration are more likely to have at
least part of the cost assessed to the parties involved. An example of
when this might affect the overall process is when the fact-finder's
86. In Iowa, for example, the Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) may appoint
a mediator upon request and must appoint a fact-finder if the mediation fails unless the
parties choose to eliminate the fact-finding step. IOWA CODE § 20.1-.29 (1979).
87. Meagher, supra note 7, at 179.
88. Iowa and Ohio are examples.
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recommendation is available to the arbitrator. Even if both parties are
required to share the cost, the losing party at the fact-finding will be
unlikely to want to pay the costs of arbitration since it is highly probable
that the arbitrator will adopt the fact-finder's recommendation. 9
Another critical factor is the statutory timetable for implementing
the process. It is suggested that a shorter and more rigid timetable may
produce fewer settlements.90 It might be argued, however, that in order
to maintain a functional and responsive process and also to provide
some of the "pressure" inherent in encouraging voluntary settlement at
various junctures, the timeline must be tight, while remaining realistic.
A key factor that impacts the whole process is the right to strike.
Although the strike is a type of "dispute resolution technique," it has
long been considered alien to the public sector. It has been argued that
the political process is an adequate remedy for public employees and
that a strike by public employees is not accompanied by the same
economic pressure on the employer inherent in the private sector.9'
However, as public sector collective bargaining has grown in the past
twenty years, the attitudes about public employee strikes have started
to change and a few states have chosen to recognize a qualified right
to strike. In those jurisdictions that permit strikes, 92 the right is still
almost universally withheld from essential public safety employees. In
most jurisdictions, mediation, fact-finding, and interest arbitration are
considered strike substitutes. Some of the variations previously discussed
were designed to put more "teeth" into the process so it more closely
approximates the power of the strike. Binding final offer arbitration is
the best example.
In those jurisdictions that permit a qualified right to strike, the parties
may perceive a strike as creating substantial costs, some of which are
difficult to measure or accurately predict. Public employers, probably
more than employees, are pressured to successfully utilize dispute res-
olution procedures in an effort to avoid the costs of a strike, much the
same as in the private sector. Instead of loss of profits, however, the
public sector costs are more likely to be of a political nature. 9 In some
states where striking is permitted, there is no binding dispute resolution
procedure available.94 This exacerbates the employer's risk even more.
89. J. GRODIN, D. WVOLLEIr & R. ALLEYNE, supra note 34; at 280.
90. Seplowitz, supra note 24, at 179.
91. Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 943, 949 (1969).
92. States allowing at least some employees to strike include Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. 2 PUB.
EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH) 6500.
93. Feuille, supra note 77, at 4.
94. California, Hawaii, and Montana. 1 PUB. EMPLOYEE BARGAINING REP. (CCH)
4000.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
V THE OHIO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
LAW FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES:9
A CASE STUDY
Ohio has one of the newer collective bargaining statutes and provides
a good case study for examining how the combination and configuration
dispute resolution procedures, and a variety of extrinsic factors, interact
to impact each individual technique as well as the process as a whole.
A radically new approach to public sector collective bargaining in Ohio
began on April 1, 1984. Prior to that time, the only existing state
legislation relating to public employees prevented public employee strikes.96
In 1970, Ohio tried to implement legislative change in this area, but
failed in three successive attempts. 97 The fourth attempt in 1983 was
successful and Ohio became the thirty-ninth state to implement public
sector collective bargaining with the enactment of Senate Bill 133,
effective April 1, 1984.98 The legislation was a response to the accel-
erating public employee collective bargaining activity including mem-
orandums of understanding between employers and employee organizations
that bore a remarkable resemblance to labor contracts. 99 Another concern
was the increasing use of illegal strikes, particularly among teachers.1'°
The dispute resolution procedures provided by the Ohio statute apply
either in the case of initial negotiations when a union is first recognized
or negotiations triggered by the termination or request for modification
of an existing collective bargaining agreement. 0 1
Before discussing the statutorily mandated process, it is important to
note that Ohio has incorporated a mechanism to bypass the statutory
procedures if the parties mutually agree in writing to a voluntary
settlement procedure. 0 2 In the first two years, this feature proved to be
95. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4117 (Page Supp. 1983).
96. Ohio State Employment Relations Board, Annual Report 2 (April, 1984 - March,
1985).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. J. LEWIS & S. SPIRN, OHIO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW 3 (1983).
100. Note, Collective Bargaining in Ohio s Public Sector: The Blueprint of Senate
Bill 222 for Constructive Labor Relations, 7 CAP. U. L. REV. 295 (1977).
101. The Ohio statute discusses its dispute resolution procedures in § 4117.14 of the
Ohio Revised Code Annotated (Page Supp. 1983). The passage of the statute has resulted
in a substantial number of newly certified bargaining representatives for Ohio's public
employees. According to the Ohio State Employment Relations Board's Annual Report
for April, 1985 - December, 1985, as a result of 294 separate elections, state employees
chose bargaining representatives in 225 of the elections. Another 267 were certified through
voluntary recognition. The process of negotiating the initial bargaining contracts is pro-
ceeding atthe writing of this Article.
102. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(1). The statute lists a non-exclusive list of alternatives including
conventional arbitration of all unsettled issues, arbitration confined to a choice between
the last offer of each party as a single package, arbitration confined to a choice of the
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quite popular. Approximately fifty percent of the notices to negotiate
filed with State Employment Relations Board (SERB) have opted for
a mutually agreeable dispute resolution procedure.0 3 The statute provides
a non-exhaustive list of potential techniques, but statistics are unavailable
as to what techniques have been utilized. If the parties are unable to
agree on a procedure within forty-five days of the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement, the statutory procedure becomes ef-
fective.'04 The statute also permits the parties, at any time during the
process, to submit the dispute to a mutually acceptable dispute settlement
procedure. 05
The Ohio statute incorporates all three of the primary dispute res-
olution techniques, mediation, fact-finding, and binding interest arbitra-
tion, which the legislature has labeled as "conciliation." Mediation, as
provided for in the statute, is both a first step in the process and an
ongoing part of the process. SERB is empowered to appoint a mediator
either at impasse or forty-five days prior to the expiration of an existing
collective bargaining agreement. 06 There are roughly two weeks for
mediation to be commenced prior to the next step in the process.
Mediation is then available at every step of the process, conducted
either by SERB or by the neutral third-party in control of the current
procedure. 07
If the parties remain at impasse within thirty-one days of the expiration
of the agreement, SERB must immediately appoint a fact-finding panel
of one to three members selected by the parties from a list of qualified
neutrals maintained by SERB.I°i Within sixteen days, the fact-finding
panel must hold a hearing and submit its recommendations on unresolved
issues to the parties and SERB unless the parties mutually agree to an
extension. 0 9 The panel's recommendation will become binding within
seven days unless either the legislature or the public employee 6 rga-
nization rejects the recommendations by a three-fifths vote of their
respective memberships. If either one rejects the recommendations, the
findings are publicized." 0 Functionally, this requirement makes over-
turning the fact-finder's recommendation extremely difficult. This is the
last offer of each party to the agreement on each issue submitted, any one of the three
previously listed procedures and including the fact-finder's recommendation at one of the
arbitrator's choices, settlement by a citizen's conciliation council, or any other dispute
settlement procedure mutually agreed to by the parties.
103. Ohio State Employment Relations Board, Annual Report 15 (April, 1984 - March,
1985).
104. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
105. Id. at § 4117.14(E).
106. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(2).
107. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(4)(F), (D)(2), & (G)(1).
108. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(3).
109. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(5).
110. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(6).
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final step in the process for all but essential public safety employees,
unless they are able to overcome the three-fifths vote obstacle. If they
are able to meet the three-fifths vote requirement, the contract expires,
they have given ten days notice, and those public employees not con-
sidered essential may then strike."'
The three-fifths vote required to prevent a binding fact-finder's re-
commendation may have an ironic result, if the goal of the process is
to give the employees additional bargaining power. The number of votes
required in the legislature to achieve a three-fifths vote is much smaller
than the number of votes required for a large employee organization.
As a result, this clause tends to favor the employer rather than the
employees.12 A factor that may mitigate this result, but has yet to be
determined, is whether the legislature can be responsive to the seven
day time frame to which they are bound.
For essential public safety employees who are denied the right to
strike under the statute,"3 there is an additional step in the process.
These employees are required to proceed to a final offer settlement
(which the statute terms "conciliation") by a single conciliator. This
occurs if the parties are unable to reach agreement within seven days
of the publishing of the fact-finder's recommendations or if the contract
expires. ' 14
There are two unusual features in Ohio's final offer settlement pro-
cedure. First, the resolution is done on an issue-by-issue basis rather
than a "total package" approach."' The fact-finder's recommendation
is available to the conciliator but may not be one of the options. The
conciliator's choice between the parties' final offers is based on six
criteria enumerated in the statute.' 1 61n the Ohio design, a final submitted
11l. Id. at § 4117.14(D)(2).
112. Perez, supra note 12, at 216.
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(D)(2) (Page Supp. 1983). The following
employees are not permitted to strike under the Ohio statute: members of a police or
fire department, members of the state highway patrol or civilian dispatchers employed
by a public employer other than a police, fire, or sheriff's department to dispatch police,
fire, sheriff's department, or emergency medical or rescue personnel and units, an exclusive
nurse's unit, employees of the state school for the deaf or the state school for the blind,
employees of any public employee retirement system, corrections officers, guards at penal
or mental institutions, special policemen or policewomen appointed in accordance with
sections 5119.14 and 5123.13 of the Revised Code, psychiatric attendants employed at
mental health forensic facilities, or youth leaders employed at juvenile correctional facilities.
114. Id. at § 4117.14(D)(1).
115. Id. at § 4117.14(G)(7).
116. Id. at § 4117.14(G)(7)(A)-(F). Factors to be considered by the conciliator when
resolving the dispute between the parties on an "issue-by-issue" basis are as follows:
(A) Past collectively bargained agreements, if any, between the parties;
(B) Comparison of the issues submitted to final offer settlement relative to the
employees in the bargaining unit involved with those issues related to other public
and private employees doing comparable work, giving consideration to factors peculiar
to the area and classification involved;
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offer can be different from the last offer presented during fact-finding.
The second unusual feature is that the conciliator may attempt mediation
at any time. This configuration is essentially med-arb." 7 One potential
problem is that the conciliator may not have the skill to both mediate
and arbitrate. The conciliator has thirty days to conduct a hearing after
which a written decision is issued that is then binding and enforceable.,
Statistics for the utilization of the dispute resolution procedures in
the Ohio statute are currently limited to the first twenty-one months
of implementation ending December 31, 1985.119 In those twenty-one
months, of the 2,145 notices to negotiate received by SERB, almost
half of those settled involved use of the statutory impasse procedures.120
During that time, 937 mediators, 508 fact-finders, and 52 conciliators
were appointed.' 2 1 Close to seventy-five percent of all negotiations were
completed with either no assistance or mediation alone.12 2 Of those parties
utilizing fact-finding, nineteen percent were settled with the fact-finder
mediating. 2 1 Where the fact-finding resulted in a recommendation, forty-
six percent were accepted by the parties. 2 4 Unions rejected only half
the number of recommendations that employers rejected because of the
burden the three-fifths vote places upon a union with a large mem-
bership. 25 To date, Ohio has experienced an average of seven strikes
per year. 2 6 It is impossible to draw any significant conclusions from
these statistics, particularly since there is little information on those
who opted for alternative procedures, what the procedures are, and
whether they have been utilized.
Several of the extrinsic factors discussed above are relevant to the
Ohio statute as it is being implemented. At present, the Federal Me-
(C) The interests and welfare of the public, the ability of the public employer to
finance and administer the issues proposed, and the effect of the adjustments on the
normal standard of public service;
(D) The lawful authority of the public employer;
(E) The stipulations of the parties;
(F) Such other factors, not confined to those listed in this section, which are
normally or traditionally taken into consideration in other impasse resolution procedures
in the public service or in private employment.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
118. Orlio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(G)(2) & (10) (Page Supp. 1983).
119. Statistics are available in the following three documents: Ohio State Employment
Relations Board, Annual Report (Apr., 1984 - Mar., 1985); Ohio State Employment
Relations Board, Annual Report (Apr., 1985 - Dec., 1985); The Report of the Public
Employment Advisory and Counseling Effort Commission to the General Assembly and
Governor of Ohio (Mar. 1, 1986) [hereinafter P.E.A.C.E. Comm's].
120. P.E.A.C.E. Comm's, supra note 119, at 44.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 47.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 61.
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diation and Conciliation Service provides SERB with all of its media-
tors. 27 There is discussion of eventually having full-time, paid mediators
employed by SERB, but that appears to be a distant goal.'28 The fact-
finders and conciliators are selected and appointed from a roster of
individuals who submit resumes to SERB, which then decides if their
qualifications are acceptable.19
Another factor discussed above concerns who is responsible for paying
for the procedures. 30 Ohio's statute has a graduated system which
requires the parties to pay more at each step. Mediation is free."' The
cost of fact-finding is divided so that the State pays for half and each
of the parties pay one-fourth of the total cost.' 32The cost of conciliation
is borne equally by the parties."' This system makes it progressively
more expensive and encourages parties to settle.
One of the most controversial issues related to the Ohio statute is
the timeline. The timeline is both short and rigid, which, as discussed
earlier, 34 may actually inhibit voluntary settlement. The annual report
for the first year indicated that SERB was able to adhere fairly closely
to the designated timelines. 35 However, it is too early to determine if
all the parties involved will be able to do as well and whether the
timeline will be a significant factor that impacts the effectiveness of
the procedures. There is some indication that mediation prior to fact-
finding is not being utilized. That may be due to the fact that the
parties are relying on the remainder of the process as much as the
timeline.
Ohio is one of the few states that has incorporated a right to strike
for non-essential employees in its statute. It may be too soon to assess
the impact of this issue on the dispute resolution technique and it also
may be too interrelated with other factors to isolate its impact.
Ohio's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law136 is approaching
its third birthday Although it has been effective for almost three years,
public sector collective bargaining in Ohio is still in its infancy and
experiencing growing pains almost daily Unfortunately, the confusion
of "getting started" has left little time and effort for data collection,
and there is little statistical data available to date. Based on interviews
127. Id. at 21.
128. Interview with G. Thomas Worley, Bureau of Mediation Administrator, Ohio
State Employment Relations Board, in Columbus, Ohio (December 18, 1985).
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying note 89.
131. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(2) (Page Supp. 1983).
132. Id. at § 4117.14(C)(5).
133. Id. at § 4117.14(G)(12).
134. See supra text accompanying note 90.
135. Ohio State Employment Relations Board, supra note 103, at 14.
136. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (Page Supp. 1983).
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with selected key participants in the process,137 there appears to be some
consensus among the primary players about what is wrong with the
current configuration, as well as some disagreement about how the
problems should be solved.
In addition, the Ohio legislature was aware that the new Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Law 31 was not only new to Ohio, but
unique in several respects. In order to evaluate the newly created
statutory framework, the legislature established, as part of the law, the
Public Employment Advisory and Counseling Effort Commission, better
known as the P.E.A.C.E. Commission.139 The Commission was created
for a period of two years to assist in educating public employers, public
employees, and employee organizations about the law, and at the same
time, to obtain their comments for purposes of evaluation in order to
provide the legislature with a report by March 1, 1986. The P.E.A.C.E.
Commission has collected input from the various players involved and
synthesized the recommendations they received into the legislative report.
Two major areas seem to be most problematic. First, everyone agrees
that the timeline for the procedures is extremely unrealistic and artificial
at almost every point in the process. 40 The concern starts with the
allowance of only fifteen days of negotiation when an existing agreement
is expiring and forty-five days for an initial contract prior to the statutory
dispute resolution process taking effect. The parties feel that this time
frame completely ignores the realities of the negotiation process, which
can be extremely time consuming, and consequently, does not promote
the goal of voluntary settlement. If the parties have not chosen their
own dispute resolution procedure, once the statutory process becomes
effective there are only two weeks allotted to mediation prior to fact-
finding. Given the fact that parties may be geographically distant from
each other and that negotiating a specific labor contract may not be
the only responsibility of either the parties or the mediator, two weeks
may only allow the parties to meet once or twice at best. Once fact-
finding begins, the parties have the opportunity to agree to extend the
time frame for fact-finding. According to G. Thomas Worley, Bureau
of Mediation Administrator for SERB, the parties take advantage of
137. Interviews with G. Thomas Worley, Bureau of Mediation Administrator, Ohio
State Employment Relations Board, in Columbus, Ohio (December 18, 1985); John
Alexander, Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining,
in Columbus, Ohio (February I1, 1986); John Looman, Executive Director, P.E.A.C.E.
Comm's, in Columbus, Ohio (February 12, 1986); and David Laurensin, Legislative
Specialist, AFSCME, in Columbus, Ohio (February 12, 1986).
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.14 (Page Supp. 1983).
139. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AT, Section 7, PUB. EMPLOYEE
REP. (Ohio Edition) (April, 1984).
140. See P.E.A.C.E. Comm's, supra note 119, at 48.
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this option and file for extensions almost 90% of the time. 41 The entire
membership of the P.E.A.C.E. Commission agreed that the timeline
was unrealistic and should be extended both in total length and between
procedures. 42
The second major concern relates to the configuration of the pro-
cedures, particularly mediation and fact-finding. All of the parties agree
that mediation as it is now structured is ineffective, primarily due to
the limited time frame, but also due to the lack of binding authority
of the mediator. The only suggested advantage to mediation as it is
now structured is that it may help educate those parties who are
inexperienced in collective bargaining, as many participants still are in
Ohio. Although the parties dislike mediation in the current configuration,
all parties interviewed felt that mediation was important to the process
and could be more effective in a different configuration - either during
or after fact-finding.
By contrast, there was little concern expressed about conciliation,
which is Ohio's version of final-offer arbitration. It was suggested that
conciliation may be redundant following fact-finding. Another concern
was that "issue-by-issue" final offer arbitration is not as effective as
"total package" because there is no prioritization of issues. Neither of
these concerns were sufficiently important that they were reflected in
possible statutory changes.
The P.E.A.C.E. Commission has not made a specific recommendation
regarding the configuration, but they have offered three possible con-
figurations as alternatives for the Governor and the General Assembly
to consider. 43 The first alternative is to revise the current system com-
pletely and merely provide the dispute resolution procedures as a service
that the parties may elect to use, but are not required to use. The
second alternative would extend the current time frame in all areas and
reverse the order of mediation and fact-finding. The third alternative
is a combination of the first two. The legislature has the option of doing
nothing with the report, but the hope is that the report will provide
the impetus for needed revisions. Of the parties interviewed, all were
waiting for the legislature's reaction before considering sponsoring leg-
islation on their own.
VI. CONCLUSION
As states such as Ohio continue to evolve the collective bargaining
process in the public sector, the mechanisms for dispute resolution will
141. See Worley supra note 128.
142. See P.E.A.C.E. Comm's, supra note 119, at 48.
143. Id. at Appendices C, D, and E.
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also evolve. The unique circumstances that are presented in the public
sector, that have been previously unknown in private sector collective
bargaining, continue to provide the potential for a myriad of new
approaches to dispute resolution. Although common terms are utilized
to describe dispute resolution techniques such as mediation, fact-finding,
and arbitration, in reality, the variations within techniques, as well as
the variety of potential configurations, may require new labels in the
future in light of the different results they generate. Those commentators
that use words like "frontier" and "laboratory" to describe the state of
public sector collective bargaining in the United States have definitely
captured the essence of the evolution and experimentation that prevails.
Gay M. Gilbert

